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Abstract: This thesis explores the transformation of the Republican electoral coalition from
the party of Abraham Lincoln to the party of Donald Trump. By comparing the Trump coalition—
which Hillary Clinton said was half full of “deplorables”—with previous Democratic and
Republican presidential coalitions, the drastic change in the electoral habits of Southerners and
white working-class voters is made evident. Trump’s appeal to these voters is due not only to his
populist rhetoric but also to the presidential campaigns of Republican candidates Barry
Goldwater, Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan, as well as to George Wallace’s independent and
Democratic presidential campaigns. Trump’s unforeseen victory in 2016 has also commanded
support from both Republican voters and long-time Republican politicians. Though the strength
of this support will not be fully measured until the 2020 presidential election, this thesis offers
some preliminary thoughts by analyzing the possible impact of Trump supporters on the
approaching 2018 congressional elections.
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I. Introduction
The two major political parties—and, more importantly, the groups of voters that support
them—are constantly in flux. The idea of partisan realignment broadly refers to this changing voter
loyalty, but the specifics of realignment are often difficult to distinguish. One important feature of
all realignments, however, is durability. Any given election sees voters who support a candidate
not aligned with their party, but if this shift happens only occasionally, it is simply a deviation.
Durability, on the other hand, implies a lasting shift in party loyalty and political norms. When
these changes occur a realignment can be observed (Sundquist 1983, 4–5). Though this means that
realignment cannot be observed while it is occurring, it appears that Donald Trump, with his 2016
presidential victory, may act as the bookend of a realigning period beginning in the 1960s. At the
dawn of the 1960s, the South, as well as white working-class voters across the country, generally
voted for the Democratic Party. More than 50 years later, the same group of voters is backing
Trump, forming a coalition that Hillary Clinton claimed was half full of “deplorables.”
This transition from Democrats to deplorables is highly valuable in understanding what
motivates voters by providing an extended depiction of realignment. The evolution of the
Republican coalition was also not orchestrated by Trump alone, and the presidential elections
occurring over the past several decades have generated important data points for tracking voter
preferences throughout the years. The voters of particular interest are those who turned out in
droves to vote for Trump; this includes a large base of white working-class voters, especially in
the South and in the Rust Belt. These voters, the issues that matter to them, and how Trump drew
on these issues, are the focus of section one of this thesis. This initial section, by identifying
specific members of the Trump coalition, enables an in-depth analysis of where these voters
originated, as well as what they could mean for the futures of the two parties.
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Section two then explores the presidential campaigns and elections, as well as crucial social
movements, of recent decades with the goal of tracking the increasing affiliation of white workingclass voters with the Republican Party. This analysis begins with the advent of the New Deal,
which solidified a Democratic base comprised of voters motivated by economic issues. The
analysis moves through the tumultuous 1960s, the Reagan Democrats of the 1980s, the Obama
coalition, and the 2016 presidential election. The presidential campaigns and elections occurring
between the 1960s and 2016 have fostered a political environment conducive to white workingclass voters supporting the Republican Party and, more specifically, Donald Trump.
The third section of this thesis finally considers voters’ opinions of Trump one year into
his presidency, the effects of Trump’s presidency on the Republican Party, and the strategies of
both parties as they campaign for the 2018 midterm elections, looking to either maintain (for the
Republicans) or gain (for the Democrats) control of the House of Representatives. Though it is
still early in Trump’s presidency, the voters who supported him at the polls in 2016 still have
favorable opinions of him in 2018. The presidential election of 2020 will act as a final measure of
sorts concerning Trump’s approval among the white working-class voters and other former
Democrats, but with the steady flow of these voters toward the Republican Party over the years, it
seems plausible that Trump may sustain this movement. Thus, the transformation of the
Republican electoral coalition, beginning in the 1960s, from the party of Abraham Lincoln to the
party of “deplorables” has been nearly completed by the 2016 victory of Donald Trump and could
be finalized as soon as November 2020.
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II. Who Are Trump Voters?
On November 9, 2016, pollsters and analysists across the United States struggled to make
sense of their presidential predictions. Had their models, which almost unanimously placed Hillary
Clinton in the White House, failed? Or had Donald Trump tacitly motivated some hidden
coalition? Perhaps ambitiously, many pollsters predicted that Clinton would retain the coalition
put together by Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. This coalition is often considered to be grounded
on the support of young, diverse, well-educated, and metropolitan voters (Cohn 2016). It is true
that Clinton had higher levels of support than Trump did among these groups, but her margins of
victory were smaller than Obama’s across the board. Furthermore, an overlooked but crucial
portion of Obama’s coalition also came from whites living in the Rust Belt (Cohn 2016). Among
these voters, Trump made impressive inroads and claimed important battleground states that were
essential to victory in terms of electoral votes. This section provides an analysis of the electorate
and their preferences in 2016, the issues most important to the electorate, and Trump’s brand of
populism and how it resonated with the voters.
Trump Voter Demographics
Table 1 displays the exit polling data of selected demographic groups from both the 2012
and 2016 presidential elections. The rightmost column also displays the change in vote share for
both the Democratic and Republican candidates between the two elections. Among thirteen
groups, the margin between Clinton’s and Trump’s vote shares was greater than 10 points. A
particularly significant margin appeared between those with and without college degrees. Most
notable was the preference of voters with postgraduate degrees who favored Clinton by 21 points.
Clinton made a 3-point gain among this group compared to Obama’s performance in 2012, while
Trump suffered a 5-point loss from Romney’s performance. College graduates as a whole also
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preferred Clinton by a 9-point margin, while those without college degrees preferred Trump by 8
points (Tyson and Maniam 2016). Notably, among voters with “some college” or an associate’s
degree, Clinton received 6 points fewer than Obama did in 2012, while Trump outperformed
Romney by 4 points. In 2012, the difference was fairly negligible as both college and non-college
graduates favored Obama, the former group by 2 points and the latter by 4 points; in fact, this is
the widest gap in support between college and non-college graduates since 1980 (Tyson and
Maniam 2016).
Table 1
2012 and 2016 Presidential Election Exit Polls

2012
Barack
Obama
45
55
39
93
71
73
58
60
52
47
44
64/51
49
47
55
63
57
46
44
44

Mitt
Romney
52
44
59
6
27
26
38
37
45
51
56
35/48
48
51
42
35
42
52
54
54

2016

Change

Hillary
Donald
D
R
Clinton
Trump
Gender
Male
41
53
-4
+1
Female
54
42
-1
-2
White
37
58
-2
-1
Race
Black
88
8
-5
+2
Hispanic/Latino
65
29
-6
+2
Asian
65
29
-8
+3
Other
56
37
-2
-1
Age
18–29
55
37
-5
0
30–44
50
42
-2
-3
45–64
44
53
-3
+2
65+
45
53
-1
-3
1
Education
High school or less
45
51
--Some college/assoc. degree
43
52
-6
+4
College graduate
49
45
+2
-6
Postgraduate degree
58
37
+3
-5
Income
Under $30,000
53
41
-10
+6
$30,000–$49,999
51
42
-6
0
$50,000–$99,999
46
50
0
-2
$100,000–$199,999
47
48
+3
-6
$200,000–$249,9992
48
49
--$250,000 and more
46
48
--Religion
Protestant or other Christian
42
57
39
56
-3
-1
Catholic
50
48
45
52
-5
+4
Jewish
69
30
71
24
+2
-6
Something else
74
23
62
29
-12
+6
None
70
26
68
26
-2
0
1. In 2016, the “high school or less” bracket combined “no high school diploma” and “high school degree.” The
entries for the 2012 election represent the vote share as (no high school diploma)/(high school degree).
2. In 2012, the highest reported income bracket was “$200,000+.” The entry for the “200k-249,999” reflects this
value.
Source: Huang et al. 2016.
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Race-based electoral divisions. The starkest differences between Trump’s and Clinton’s
vote shares become apparent when race is taken into account. Overall, Trump won the white vote
by 21 points, while Clinton won the black vote by 80 points, the Hispanic/Latino vote by 36 points,
and the Asian vote by 36 points. Trump’s margin among white voters is about equal to that of
Romney’s (20 points), but Clinton, despite her victories among minorities, did not perform as well
with minority voters as Obama did in either 2008 or 2012. Applying race to other demographics
enforces the notion of Trump’s immense success among white voters. When gender and education
are broken down by race, the gender and education gaps become less apparent than the gap
between white and non-white voters. Tables 2 and 3 provide complete breakdowns of these
Table 2
Vote Share by Race and Gender, 2016
Presidential Election
% of
Clinton Trump
electorate
White men
34
31
62
White women
37
43
52
Black men
5
82
13
Black women
7
94
4
Latino men
5
63
32
Latino women
6
69
25
Other
6
61
31
Source: CNN 2016.

Table 3
Vote Share by Race and Education, 2016
Presidential Election
% of
Clinton
Trump
electorate
White
37
45
48
college
Whites no
34
29
66
degree
Non-white
13
72
6
college
Non-whites
16
76
4
no degree
Source: CNN 2016.

margins.
Concerning gender by race, Trump’s lead among men expands among white male voters
by 9 points and he actually surpasses Clinton among white female voters by a 9-point margin.
Unsurprisingly, Clinton gains a lead among non-white male voters and expands her margins
among non-white female voters. Even across all racial and ethnic groups, however, there is still
evidence of a gender gap; women consistently favor Clinton over Trump by, at the very least, a 6point margin. In terms of education, Trump leads Clinton among whites both with and without
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college degrees, while Clinton leads Trump among non-white voters both with and without college
degrees.
This pattern of voting displayed by the white electorate carried Donald Trump to victory
in the 2016 election, especially considering the other demographic groups these voters belonged
to and where they lived. Trump made impressive inroads specifically among white working-class
voters who, as will be discussed below, were drawn to his populist campaign messages. His
resounding support from white voters without college degrees and with low income provide some
insight into his support among the white working class. Both a gender and education gap among
white voters is also noticeable, as displayed in
Table 4, with only white women with college
degrees preferring Clinton over Trump.
Trump outperformed Romney by 24 points
among white voters without college degrees
making less than $30,000 per year; he won
62% of these voters compared to Clinton’s

Table 4
Education among Whites by Sex
% of
Clinton
electorate
White college20
51
grad women
White non17
34
college women
White college17
39
grad men
White non16
23
college men
Source: CNN 2016.

Trump
44
61
53
71

30%, while Romney won this group 52% to Obama’s 45%. This also represents the first
presidential election contested between the Democrats and Republicans in which the Republican
candidate performed better among low-income whites than among affluent whites (Cohn 2016).
The white working class in the Rust Belt. The white working class vote was not just
centralized in the typical Republican strongholds in the South; many of these voters were
concentrated in important battleground states, predominantly in the Rust Belt. Figures 1 and 2
provides an excellent visual of this phenomenon as the areas in which Trump improved upon
Romney’s 2012 performance closely align with areas constituted by predominantly white counties.
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Further illustrating this point is the
following

statistic:

among

municipalities within the nation’s
50 largest metropolitan areas,
Trump trailed Romney as he did in
the national popular vote, but when
the percentage of whites in the
Figure 2: Where Donald J. Trump Outperformed Mitt Romney. Confessore and
Cohn 2016.

municipality
Trump’s

reaches
support

85%,
exceeds

Romney’s and only continues to
rise as the number of whites rises
(Edsall 2017).
Many

of

these

communities are rural and smalltown

and

traditionally

vote

but

also

Figure 2: Overwhelming White Communities. Confessore and Cohn 2016.

Republican,

Trump

pushed into historically Democratic counties, namely in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
Macomb County in Michigan, Luzerne County in Pennsylvania, and Kenosha County in
Wisconsin are particularly representative of this voting pattern. All three counties are heavily
populated by white working-class voters and all three supported Obama in the 2008 and 2012
elections. Moreover, Luzerne County had supported Democratic presidential candidates since
1988 and Kenosha County had not voted Republican since supporting Richard Nixon in the 1972
presidential election (Cook 2017).

10

Counties such as these were also crucial in providing Trump the victory in these states as
they overwhelmed the support Clinton received in urban, as well as some suburban, Rust Belt
areas. Clinton carried Michigan’s Wayne County, which encompasses Detroit, Wisconsin’s
Milwaukee County, and Pennsylvania’s Allegheny County encompassing Pittsburgh, in addition
to Philadelphia and its four surrounding Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties.
Part of Clinton’s downfall, despite her urban victories, were her margins of victory in these cities:
compared with Obama’s 2012 showing, she received over 90,000 fewer votes in Wayne County,
17,000 fewer in Philadelphia, and nearly 15,000 fewer in Milwaukee. There is no clear connection
between turnout and Clinton’s declining support. In Wayne County, turnout decreased by around
38,000 voters from 2012 to 2016, while in Milwaukee there was a similar decrease of around
50,000 voters; however, there was a 17,000-voter increase in Philadelphia (Cook 2017). On the
other hand, the declining turnout of black voters—as well as their declining support for the
Democratic presidential candidate—from 2012 to 2016 could partially explain Clinton’s lessened
success in these Rust Belt cities. Black voters are generally concentrated in urban areas across the
Rust Belt and the black turnout decreased by double digits in the region, to as much as 20% in
Milwaukee and St. Louis (McQuarrie 2016, 126).
As noted, further reducing Clinton’s lead in the cities was Trump’s drastic outperformance
of Romney’s 2012 showing in the smaller cities, old industrial centers, small towns, and rural areas
of the Rust Belt states. In addition to being overwhelmingly white, Rust Belt counties such as
Macomb and Luzerne saw increased turnout, which contributed to Trump’s success. Macomb
County experienced an increased turnout of over 15,000 voters, while Luzerne saw a 10,000-voter
increase (Cook 2017). In Michigan, Trump outperformed Romney in 76 of the 83 counties,
flipping 12 counties from blue in 2012 to red in 2016. In Pennsylvania Trump outperformed
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Romney in every county but 2 and flipped Erie, Northampton, and Luzerne Counties from
Democrat to Republican, though Clinton flipped Centre and Chester counties in the opposite
direction. Finally, in Wisconsin, Trump exceeded Romney’s margins in all but 4 counties, flipping
an impressive 23 counties from blue to red. Clinton flipped no counties in the state (The New York
Times 2012; The New York Times 2017).
What Did Trump Voters Care About?
Trump’s campaign policies and his stances on major issues such as immigration and trade
were obviously crucial to his success. Understandably, the voters who reported favorable views of
Trump and unfavorable views of Clinton largely voted for Trump, while the opposite was true of
Clinton voters. However, among the 18% of voters who viewed neither candidate favorably,
Trump beat Clinton by a 20-point margin, 49% to 29%. Furthermore, among the 14% of voters
who thought neither candidate was qualified, Trump won by 54 points, 69% to 15%; and among
the 5% who thought both candidates were qualified, Trump again beat Clinton, this time by a 48point margin, 70% to 22%. Therefore, members of the electorate who did not prefer one candidate
over the other and did not see either candidate’s qualifications as particularly convincing still voted
for Trump by large margins (Anderson 2016).
The reason for this outcome was the salient issues of the 2016 elections. Economy and
terrorism ranked number one among voters as the most important issues facing the country, with
foreign policy, health care, gun policy, and immigration all also ranked high on the list. This is
true for Trump voters as well, for whom economy and terrorism were the two top issues, followed
by foreign policy and immigration. For Clinton voters, the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities
ranked number two, closely following the economy and coming in just ahead of health care. Table
5 displays the issues all voters considered to be “very important” to their vote, as well as the issues
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both Clinton and Trump voters considered to be very important. Table 6 indicates some responses
concerning specific questions about the issues as reported by exit polling data.
The two tables, taken together, indicate how the most important issues to the voters played
into Trump’s favor. For example, the economy was the most important issue for all voters, and
62% of voters in exit polls believed that the national economy was in poor condition. Of this 62%,
62% voted for Trump over Clinton. The trend is similar with opinions on foreign policy and
healthcare. A plurality of voters believed that foreign trade negatively affected American jobs and
this group favored Trump; a plurality of voters also believed that the Affordable Care Act “went
too far,” and a majority of this group favored Trump as well. Though the broader questions
concerning the actions of the federal government and the direction of the country are not tied to
specific issues, many voters who were dissatisfied with the government were likely dissatisfied
with the Obama administration in particular, resulting in negative opinions of Clinton as the
presidential candidate for the incumbent party.
Table 5
Top Issues1 for Voters in 2016
Economy
Terrorism
Foreign policy
Health care
Gun policy
Immigration
Social Security
Education
Supreme Court appointments
Treatment of racial, ethnic minorities
Trade policy
Environment
Abortion
Treatment of LGBT people

All voters
84
80
75
74
72
70
67
66
65
63
57
52
45
40

Clinton
80
74
73
77
74
65
66
73
62
79
52
69
50
54

Trump
90
89
79
71
71
79
68
58
70
42
64
32
41
25

1. Reported as percent of registered voters saying issue is “very important” to their vote in 2016.
2. Difference between Clinton and Trump voters, measured as (Trump %)-(Clinton %).

Source: Pew Research Center 2016, 31–32.

Difference2
+10
+15
+6
-6
-3
+14
+2
-15
+8
-37
+12
-37
-9
-29
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Table 6
Issue Voting, 2016 Exit Polls

Illegal immigrants working in
the U.S. should be…
U.S. wall along Mexican border
Effect of international trade

How is the fight against ISIS
going?
Obamacare…

Feelings about the federal
government
Federal government should…
Condition of national economy
Direction of the country

Offered legal status
Deported to home country
Support
Oppose
Creates U.S. jobs
Takes away U.S. jobs
Does not affect U.S. jobs
Well
Badly
Did not go far enough
Was about right
Went too far
Enthusiastic/satisfied
Angry/dissatisfied
Do more
Do less
Good
Poor
Right direction
Wrong track

% of
electorate
70
25
41
54
39
42
11
41
53
30
18
47
29
69
45
50
36
62

Clinton

Trump

61
14
10
76
59
32
65
73
25
78
83
13
76
36
74
22
77
31

33
83
85
16
35
64
30
22
68
18
10
82
19
57
22
72
18
62

33
62

89
26

7
68

Source: CNN 2016.

When voters were asked which candidate would better handle the issues they listed as
important, Clinton had an edge over Trump in 9 of the 12 categories. Trump’s advantages over
Clinton, in the opinion of the electorate, were in his ability to improve economic conditions, defend
the country against future terrorist attacks, and reduce special interest influence. Trump’s edge in
the economy and terrorism are especially important, given how highly the voters ranked these
issues in importance (Pew Research Center 2016, 36). Immigration also became an especially
prominent issue. About one-eighth of voters believed immigration to be the most important issue
facing the country and 14% more Trump supporters than Clinton supporters ranked this issue as
“very important.” Among the voters who considered immigration to be the absolute most
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important, Trump won by a 32-point margin, 64% to 32%. This amounted to nearly 5 million votes
(Anderson 2016).
Trade too affected the campaign; 12% more Trump voters than Clinton voters considered
trade to be “very important.” Moreover, 42% of voters believed international trade is likely to take
away American jobs, while 38% believed trade creates job. Among those who distrusted trade,
Trump held a 34-point margin over Clinton, while Clinton enjoyed a smaller margin of 24 points
among those who supported trade. This split was even more pronounced in the Rust Belt. When
asked whether foreign trade was good or bad for America, 53% of voters in Pennsylvania said bad
versus 24% who said good. In Ohio the voters split 48% versus 32% in terms of bad versus good,
in Wisconsin 50% to 35%, and in Michigan 50% to 31% (Anderson 2016). The way Trump voters
feel about these issues, in conjunction with the following discussion of Trump’s populist message,
provides a clearer picture of his appeal to many voters.
Trump’s Populist Appeal to Voters
Populism is “a type of political rhetoric that pits a virtuous ‘people’ against nefarious,
parasitic elites who seek to undermine the rightful sovereignty of the common folk” and is most
frequently tied to class conflict and economic disparities (Oliver and Rahn 2016, 190). The goal
of populism is thus often restorative: it seeks to replace perceived corruption with a new political
order that restores the “people” to their rightful place—whatever that may be—and is responsive
to the people’s needs and ambitions. The “people” are generally defined as anyone who is not an
elite as populists hope to forge solidarity among large groups who have been treated poorly by the
governing class. However, in targeting groups, populism often excludes as many as it attempts to
include. Thus, nativism and racism are common in populist appeals. Anti-elitism and collectivism
are also common features of populist campaigns. Stylistically, these campaigns are simplistic,
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direct, and emotional, which often serves to make the candidate appear authentic, further
distinguishing that person from establishment politicians. “The populist,” Oliver and Rahn
therefore claim, “disrupts the normal dinner table, much to the discomfort, even alarm, of the usual
patrons” (Oliver and Rahn 2016, 191). Criticism from these establishment politicians—the
disrupted usual patrons—often only serves to strengthen the bonds between populist leaders and
their followers.
In 2016, Donald Trump wrote an opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal claiming that
“the only antidote to decades of ruinous rule by a small handful of elites is a bold infusion of
popular will. On every major issue affecting this country, the people are right and the governing
elite are wrong. The elites are wrong on taxes, on the size of government, on immigration, on
foreign policy” (Trump 2016). Trump’s intent is clearly to pit the “people” against the elite who
are apparently guiding the country in the wrong direction, making this statement emblematic of
his populist campaign. Indeed, in analyzing candidacy-announcement speeches of six 2016
presidential hopefuls, Trump, followed only by Ben Carson, emerges as the most consistent user
of populist syntax (Oliver and Rahn 2016, 193).
The analysis looked closely at rates of anti-establishment and people-centric language, as
well as language simplicity. In the anti-establishment category, Trump scored highest in political
populism and trailed only Bernie Sanders in his usage of blame language. The people-centric
category aims to measure collectivist appeals; while Clinton frequently invoked “Americans” or
American people,” Trump commonly used the phrase “our country” as well as “we-they” rhetoric.
In the final category measuring language simplicity, or the “everydayness” of the candidates’
speeches, Trump’s sentences were significantly briefer and his words noticeably shorter than those
of the Democratic candidates, conceivably appealing to members of his coalition with lower levels
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of education. Furthermore, Trump’s word choice was not varied (Oliver and Rahn 2016, 194). In
order for Donald Trump’s brand of populism to rally the “people” and convince them to vote
against the Democratic Party, which represented the political establishment, these voters had to be
receptive to populism. Luckily for Trump, the voters he was targeting were very receptive. In
asking voters who they would support in the general election, as well as measuring their responses
to another group of questions in terms of national affiliation, mistrusting experts, and anti-elitism,
Trump voters consistently displayed populist attitudes (Oliver and Rahn 2016, 199).
The opinions of Trump voters are particularly striking when compared with those of
Sanders voters. Sanders also ran a fairly populist campaign and his supporters scored even higher
than Trump voters in the anti-elitism category. However, Sanders’s supporters also scored the
lowest in both national affiliation and mistrusting experts (Oliver and Rahn 2016, 200). These
attitudinal differences signal great difference between the type of populist Trump and Sanders are.
Whereas Sanders did not wholeheartedly reject establishment politics and instead hoped for a more
reformist path, Trump was more vehement in his anti-elitist and anti-establishment goals. Thus,
Sanders’s campaign appeared more to be a struggle against the Democratic Party and the direction
its platform would take, while Trump’s campaign represented a struggle against the political
system entirely (Eiermann 2016, 34). As will be further explored in the following section, many
voters, especially the white working class, have been struggling against the political system for
decades and the attention paid to them by Trump’s campaign was incredibly rousing.
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III. Where Did Trump Voters Come From?
Donald Trump’s stance on the issues and his populist campaign did not produce the Trump
coalition out of thin air. Rather, decades of struggle and realignment between the parties made the
victory of the Republican candidate possible in 2016. The “New Deal coalition,” forged by
Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s, grounded party politics in economic divisions. However, as
the nation entered the tumultuous 1960s, the two parties were forced to shift focus from economic
issues to pressing social issues, such as demands for racial equality and ending the war in Vietnam.
The Republican Party capitalized on the voters who were not fond of the Democrats’ progressive
social policies and, through the campaigns of Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon, added many
white Southerners and white working-class voters to their constituency. Ronald Reagan’s
campaigns and presidency all but solidified these voting blocs and completed the demise of the
Democratic “Solid South.” Even so, Democratic candidates such as Bill Clinton and Barack
Obama won back small portions of the Democrat-turned-Republican voters, only for Trump to
surprise the nation on Election Day in 2016.
The New Deal Era
The Democratic Party, before ever having been associated with the civil rights movement,
was known as the champion of working-class households. Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
New Deal in 1932, the Democrats forged a system of government—and a voting bloc—grounded
in government intervention and welfare provisions designed to benefit labor and the working class
(Rae 1994, 13). Conversely, the Republican Party, whose two major voting blocs were western
progressives and eastern liberals, found fault with the advent of this interventionist era (Rae 1989,
25). These party attitudes have endured nearly a century of election cycles and candidates, and
have had a lasting effect on the minds of the American electorate. New Deal policies involved
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increasing government spending and regulation, as well as the promotion of labor unions at a time
when the economy was dominated by mass production industries. Consequently, the Democratic
politicians who upheld these policies stood firmly with those who worked industrial jobs. This
coalition, in addition to some cross-class Democratic support among groups such as Jews and
Southerners, was responsible for promoting a new welfare state and the subsequent expanded
American government (Teixeria and Abramowitz 2008, 6–7).
The New Dealers continued to prevail into and past the 1950s; as the government continued
to fund public works, schools, and science, the nation saw the emergence of a true middle class
that members of the working class could aspire to. Thus the working class’s relationship with the
Democratic Party was two-sided: while the party depended on the working class for political
support, the working class relied on the Democrats to foster an economic environment that allowed
them to work toward middle-class status (Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008, 7). However, tensions
among party factions were also rising around this time period. The more liberal wing of the
Democratic Party wanted to move the party in a pro-civil rights direction; this group was frustrated
with what it saw as a stagnant and overly pluralistic approach to politics by the Democrats, and it
pushed for an explicitly socially progressive platform. These liberals were less concerned with
economic needs of the working class at the time as they were predominantly voters already
enjoying middle-class lifestyles and therefore were less concerned with economic policies
designed to raise voters from the working class into the middle class (Rae 1994, 14).
The New Deal coalition was also strongly shaped by religion. The Democratic Party
enjoyed overwhelming support among Catholic voters across the country, as well as Southern
Protestants; the Republican Party conversely was the “party of northern Protestants” (Ladd, Jr. and
Hadley 1978, 52). The Protestant–Catholic divide becomes even more prevalent with the added

19

factor of class. Protestants of high socioeconomic status (SES) consistently favored Republican
presidential and congressional candidates from 1940 to 1960, with middle-SES Protestants doing
so to a lesser degree. Protestant voters of low SES occasionally deviated from the Republican Party
during these two decades, but never supported Democratic candidates as strongly as Catholic
voters. High-SES Catholics, in contrast, sided frequently with Republican candidates, though to a
lesser extent than their Protestant counterparts. Middle- and low-SES Catholic voters did vote
consistently Democrat during this twenty-year span, with low-SES Catholics lending the strongest
support to Democratic candidates (Ladd, Jr. and Hadley 1978, 122).
The Tumultuous 1960s
The New Deal coalition marched into a new decade, and the Democrats held a majority in
both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The status quo of American politics seemed
unchanged as economic issues remained salient and the Democrats, bolstered by the working class,
espoused economic liberalism. The Republican Party, on the other hand, was biased toward the
upper and middle classes and therefore presented a more economically conservative platform.
Economic debate, however, could not continue to dominate the political arena as social issues
began to move to the forefront in the 1960s. Prior to the turn of the decade, the Democratic Party,
given the support of the Solid South, maintained a conservative stance on issues involving race,
while the Republicans were under less pressure to do so (Paulson 2000, 96). The changes to party
platforms and subsequent changes in partisanship demonstrate the beginning of a realigning era
within the parties, an era that was reinforced by several campaigns and elections during the 1960s.
The Kennedy–Johnson years. The Solid South had been reaffirmed during the New Deal
era due to an emphasis on economic issues, which both benefited the working class, and turned a
blind eye to race-based southern social systems (Rae 1994, 40). As noted, however, the Democratic
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Party was increasingly being identified with the liberal north and “social democratic” political
trends that threatened the South’s discriminatory structures (Rae 1994, 41). Exemplifying the
tightrope walk that was required to remain in the party’s good graces, Texas Senator Lyndon B.
Johnson, in his quest for Democratic presidential nomination in 1960, had helped enact civil rights
legislation. However, he also recognized the North–South regional divisions within his party and,
as majority leader, worked to suppress the “race question” during debates in the Senate (Grantham
1988, 150). Johnson did not obtain the Democratic presidential nomination, but his work was
rewarded with an invitation to join John F. Kennedy’s ticket as the Democratic vice-presidential
nominee.
Then, in November, even with the establishment of civil rights as an official plank of the
Democratic platform, the Kennedy–Johnson ticket was able to win in the South. Although
Kennedy lost some ground among Protestant voters for himself being a Catholic, the increased
support of Catholic voters outweighed the negative effects of the Protestants (Ladd, Jr. and Hadley
1978, 120). Furthermore, Johnson’s southern support in the primaries carried into the general
election, especially among Southern voters (Grantham 1988, 152). Yet the pressure of balancing
demands for civil rights action on one hand and the much needed support of the Solid South on
the other was still evident in the early years of the Kennedy administration. While it tacitly
encouraged the “voluntary acceptance of the civil rights of black people in the South,” it
simultaneously avoided passing regulations that would legally enforce civil rights policies
(Grantham 1988, 154). Yet with an increasing number of sit-ins, demonstrations, and violence as
the 1960s rolled on, the President was forced to take more meaningful action against racial
discrimination. Following an attack by Ku Klux Klan members and other angered whites on the
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Freedom Rider movement in 1961, Kennedy petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission to
desegregate all bus and railroad terminals (Grantham 1988, 155).
While this was a win for blacks and civil rights activists, it represented the first major defeat
for southern segregationists at the hands of the Democratic Party. This was also just the first of
many federal actions taken by the Kennedy administration to forward civil rights; the equal rights
movement continued to gain momentum as the President moved to aid in the integration of schools
and other facilities (Grantham 1988, 157). With Kennedy’s assassination, however, the future of
the movement at first seemed uncertain. Soon after, though, President Johnson reemphasized the
administration’s commitment to civil rights legislation with his efforts culminating in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Grantham 1988, 157–8). The act was, to Democrats outside of the South,
widely supported and virtually uncontentious (Paulson 2000, 104).
In the South, however, the Democrats faced significant opposition on the road to the 1964
presidential election. In Mississippi, for example, Johnson worked to compromise with the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and allowed a few convention seats to go to this
challenging party. Even so, no major Democrat in the state endorsed Johnson’s election. Other
Southern politicians had seemingly similar sentiments. Senator Strom Thurmond of South
Carolina left the Democratic Party to support the Republican presidential nominee Barry
Goldwater; likewise, Governor George Wallace of Alabama briefly challenged Johnson in the
primaries, only to pull out and encourage conservative southerners to back Goldwater (Grantham
1988, 160). The Johnson–Humphrey ticket remained victorious, but the Democrats’ overall vote
share in the South dropped nearly 7% from the 1960 election to the 1964 election, from 50% in
the former to just over 43% in the latter.
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As Johnson worked through his first full term as president, the civil rights movement
continued to make progress via legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
reapportionment of congressional districts (Grantham 1988, 164). The movement, coupled with
the South’s increasingly diversified economy and urbanized environment, only added pressure to
the tumultuous political climate of the region (Grantham 1988, 165). Thus, following the 1964
election, the Democratic Party was embroiled in debate between its progressives in the North and
its conservatives in the South, two emerging factions that had seemingly irreconcilable views
concerning the prevalent social issues of the time (Paulson 2000, 94). At the same time as the Solid
South slowly crept out of the Democrats’ grasp, Republicans recognized that they had the potential
to bring rural, lower-class whites into their party and began to work toward establishing a stronger
base in the South (Rae 1994, 42).
The GOP struggle for control. Following Richard Nixon’s defeat in the 1960 presidential
election, internal strife overtook the Republican Party. Whereas liberal Republicans argued that
Nixon could have won had he more strongly advocated civil rights, the conservative wing of the
party felt that Nixon would have found success by endorsing states’ rights and advocating the
reversal of the welfare state (Paulson 2000, 99). While it is impossible to know whether either
wing of the party was correct, the Republican Party had four years until the next presidential
election to reconsider its campaign approach. These four years resulted in an attempt by Barry
Goldwater and his supporters to overhaul the Republican Party. The “Draft Goldwater” movement
began in 1961 with the purpose of consolidating the resources of various conservative
organizations that were pushing for Goldwater’s nomination (Rae 1989, 53). Goldwater was first
elected to the Senate in 1952 and quickly began promoting a message of “undiluted southwestern

23

conservatism” as exemplified by his book The Conscious of a Conservative, published in 1960
(Rae 1989, 54).
The Draft Goldwater initiative and the eventual Goldwater campaign were successful; the
Arizona senator clinched the Republican nomination over New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller
with a primary victory in California. His success, despite his right-wing ideology, was largely
predicated upon his understanding that opposition to the federal government connected both
Western Republicans and Southern civil rights opponents. To integrate these two camps, he
furthered the notion of states’ rights to incorporate both anti-regulation and anti-integration voters
into a single coalition (Miller and Schofield 2008, 438). However, tensions were still high at the
Republican National Convention as debate ensued over the party’s platform. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given the similar discord on the Democratic side, a battle was waged over the civil
rights platform plank.
The Goldwater-controlled platform committee promised to implement the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, but the liberal Republicans put forward a more progressive plank, calling for a total
overhaul of federal anti-discrimination laws. This liberal contingent hoped to gain enough national
sympathy for their cause to stop Goldwater’s spread of conservatism, but they failed to realize that
Goldwater’s supporters were “conservatives first and Republicans second” (Paulson 2000, 101).
Thus, the proposed amendment was struck down, and Goldwater’s support for states’ rights was
officially adopted, a notion that completely conflicted with the “Lincolnian tradition” of the
Republican Party in years past and left the liberal wing of the party in shock (Rae 1989, 73).
Goldwater’s conservative strategies, of course, did not win him the general election. Yet,
he claimed victories in five Southern states—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South
Carolina—a feat no other post-Reconstruction Republican presidential candidate could claim (see
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Table 1). Goldwater himself recognized this and called for nationwide realignment of the twoparty system into new “Liberal” and “Conservative” parties. He issued this statement less than two
weeks after the election, noting that classically Republican business leaders and suburbanites voted
Democratic, while former Democratic Southerners went Republican (Mazo 1964). This showing
in the South, as well as the upheaval of traditional voting blocs, pointed toward the potential for
success using a “southern strategy” to win over anti-integration southerners in future elections.
Thus, with Goldwater effectively taking the initial steps to transforming the Republican Party into
an increasingly conservative organization, party officials could now focus on putting forward a
candidate who would be successful in an evolving political climate.
The 1968 presidential election. The year leading up to the 1968 presidential election was
teeming with both political and social tensions, the most prominent involving the war in Vietnam
and the civil rights movement. As the American death toll rose, so too did the frequency of antiwar
protests with jeers directed pointedly at President Johnson (Gould 1993, 8). In October of 1967,
just over a year prior to the election, Johnson’s approval ratings had fallen to an abysmal 31%.
Johnson’s stance on civil rights was also continuing to cause discomfort in voters across the
country; by August 1967, “racial problems” were reported to be the number one concern of 8 out
of 10 surveyed Americans (Gould 1993, 12). This poll came after a 1966 survey reporting that
75% of white voters thought that blacks were “moving ahead too fast” and demanding too much
at the expense of whites. Furthermore, many white union members claimed that they did not vote
Democratic in the 1966 congressional because they wanted to “protest against [the Democrats’]
advocacy of civil rights” (Gould 1988, 13).
Enter George Wallace, Alabama governor and third-party presidential candidate in 1968.
In his inaugural address as governor in 1963, Wallace proclaimed, “Segregation now! Segregation
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tomorrow! Segregation forever!” and later attempted to block the integration of state schools with
his “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door” display at the University of Alabama (Gould 1988, 30). This
racially charged messaging carried over into Wallace’s bid for the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1964. However, in 1968, he claimed that race was no longer his focus. Instead, he
targeted the federal government, claiming that the real source of the electorate’s backlash was
elitist bureaucrats. His language did remain racially coded as he vowed not to spend federal funds
on school busing, and he also reached out to the white working class in the North, speaking to the
anxieties of “the average man in the street, the man in the textile mill, this man in the steel mill”
(Gould 1988, 31).
Wallace’s campaign thus mirrored much of Goldwater’s conservative rhetoric from 1964,
and he consequently won four of the five Deep South states that had gone for Goldwater:
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana. Wallace additionally won Arkansas, as well as a
“faithless elector” from North Carolina. Beyond support from segregationists, Wallace’s populist
pleas rallied a large contingent of working-class whites throughout the South and even garnered
8% of the popular vote outside of the region (Carter 1995, 369). Nixon managed to maintain a hold
on the growing Southern, suburban middle class and carried Florida, Kentucky, Virginia,
Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina (Rae 1994, 47). The performances of these two
candidates continued to build upon the growing Republican influence in the South set in motion
by Goldwater. Whereas in the North, Wallace voters divided evenly between who they would
choose had Wallace not been in the race, in the South 4 out of 5 Wallace voters said they would
have voted for Nixon without Wallace’s presence (Carter 1995, 369). The Democrats, on the other
hand, had not fared so well, and the region, as well as their traditional supporters, seemed to be
slipping from reach.
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The collapse of the Solid South. The Democrats had faced a tumultuous election year;
Johnson pulled out of the race following early primary losses to Eugene McCarthy who then fell
behind a surging Robert Kennedy. After Kennedy’s assassination, only McCarthy and Humphrey
remained to battle for the nomination (Carter 1995, 331). Senator George McGovern of South
Dakota entered the primaries in Kennedy’s place, but in the weeks leading up to the Democratic
National Convention, the party’s coalition was in disarray. Many liberal Democrats hoped to
distance themselves from President Johnson’s stances on the war in Vietnam, and the eventual
platform proposal advocated an end to the bombing and a negotiated withdrawal from the war.
President Johnson, however, disapproved of the proposal and the plank did not pass. What
followed was protests in the streets of Chicago outside of the convention against Humphrey’s
eventual nomination by a closed system. These protests represented the incredible tension running
through American politics at the time (Gould 1988, 116–122).
Perhaps most notable about the 1968 election results, however, was the near-total collapse
of the Democratic Solid South, especially in terms of presidential elections. While support had
been obviously dwindling for years, 1968 brought the lowest amount of Democratic support in the
region since the advent of the New Deal (see Table 7). The drop was, less extreme, however, for
state and congressional elections. Largely due to the effects of the white working class persuaded
by Democratic economic policies, ballots were split between the parties with the Republicans
being successful in presidential bids and Democrats coming out on top in lower-level elections.
Despite their distaste for the Democrats’ progressive social policies, it was rational for these voters
to back the party in lower-level elections whose outcomes more directly affected services and
programs relating to their economic positions. At the presidential level, however, it was logical for

27

white working-class voters to support the Republicans, as the president sets an “appropriate
national tone” concerning social policies (Rae 1994, 51–2).
Table 7
Democratic Share of Presidential Vote in the South1 (%), 1932-1968
AL
AR
FL
GA
LA
MS
NC
1932
84.8
86.3
74.5
91.6
92.8
96.0
69.9
1936
86.4
81.8
76.1
87.1
88.8
97.0
73.4
1940
85.2
78.4
74.0
84.8
85.9
95.7
74.0
1944
81.3
70.0
70.3
81.7
80.6
93.6
66.7
19482
0.0
61.7
48.8
60.8
32.7
10.1
58.8
1952
64.6
55.9
45.0
69.7
52.9
60.4
53.9
1956
56.5
52.5
42.7
66.4
39.4
58.2
50.7
19603
56.8
50.2
48.5
62.5
50.4
36.3
52.1
1964
0.0
56.1
51.1
45.9
43.2
12.9
56.2
19684
18.7
30.4
30.9
26.7
28.2
23.0
29.2

SC
98.0
98.6
95.6
87.6
24.1
50.7
45.4
51.2
41.1
29.6

TN
66.5
68.8
67.3
60.4
49.1
49.7
48.6
45.8
55.5
28.1

TX
88.1
87.1
80.7
71.4
65.4
46.7
44.0
50.5
63.3
41.1

VA
68.5
70.2
68.1
62.4
47.9
43.4
38.4
47.0
53.5
32.5

1. Southern states defined as former Confederate states.
2. Strom Thurmond (Dixiecrat) received 11 electoral votes in AL, 10 in LA, 9 in MS, 8 in SC, and 1 in TN.
3. Harry F. Byrd (Dem.) received 6 electoral votes in AL, 8 in MS, and 1 in OK.
4. George Wallace (Indep.) received 10 electoral votes in AL, 6 in AR, 12 in HI, 10 in LA, 7 in MS, and 1 in NC.

Source: Derived from The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/elections.php.

The effect on the white working class. As the Democratic Party expanded to include more
diverse constituents, the white working class became increasingly less influential. Concerns about
quality of life in terms of economic standing, though always present, were less intense than
concerns about the environment, health care, and equal opportunity for minorities. While racial
tensions, as mentioned, played a major role in the white working class’s growing ambivalence
toward the Democratic Party, these new movements also prompted the white working class to
further question its allegiance to the party. Feminism was equated to bra-burning and lesbian
relationships and therefore was seen as a threat to the traditional nuclear family. Anti-war protests
were equated to appeasement of the Soviet Union, and the environmental movement became a
direct affront to economic growth in industrial regions. The white working class was further
concerned with crime rates, drug usage, and young progressive “hippies.” Progressive attitudes as
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a whole were considered by many white working-class voters to be a total rejection of personal
responsibility, and the Democratic Party was seemingly becoming a party of social progressives
(Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008, 8–9). Moreover, the white working class perceived social
progressives to be diverting focus from economic policies which had once benefitted workers.
The Nixon and Carter years. The distrust of the Democrats by the white working class is
evident in their drop in support for the party. Between 1960 and 1964, the average white workingclass vote for Democratic presidential candidates was 55%; this number quickly plummeted and
from 1968 to 1972 the average support of the white working class for Democratic presidential
candidates was 35%, 20 points lower (Teixeira and Abramowitz 9–10). This 20-point drop was
observed during the first term of Nixon’s presidency, and the Republican continued to make
inroads into this group and other traditional Democrats during his campaign for a second term.
Without George Wallace on the campaign trail, Nixon was able to add Southerners and urban
working Democrats in the North to his coalition, winning every state with the exception of
Massachusetts. (Rae 1989, 108). The Watergate scandal, of course, dampened the popularity of
the Republican Party, and Republican factions shifted as they tried to regain control. During this
time period, leading up to Ronald Reagan’s election, Republican liberalism began to subside (Rae
1989, 155). Emblematic of the fall of the liberal Republican was the departure of Nelson
Rockefeller, whose liberal base was unable to organize without him as a figurehead.
The electorate was also becoming increasingly receptive to conservative Republican
demands for smaller government, and the party continued its transition toward these voters (Rae
1989, 156). The exceptional case during this time period was that of Jimmy Carter, who swept the
primaries in the South, was nominated to be the Democratic presidential candidate in 1976, and
won the general election with the help of a nearly solid Democratic South. Given the aftershocks
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of the Vietnam War and Watergate, the American electorate was disinclined to trust many
politicians. It was these voters that Carter capitalized on as he attempted to muffle the social issues
that were transforming Democratic liberalism (Rae 1994, 56; Ladd, Jr. and Hadley 1978, 278).
Perhaps more important to his success was that Carter himself was a Southern white Protestant;
even so, white Protestant voters in the South were 5 points less Democratic than the national
average from the 1976 presidential election. Other classically Democratic groups such as urban
white Catholics and white working-class voters also favored Carter slightly more than they had
favored McGovern, but did not come close to replicating their New Deal levels of support (Ladd,
Jr. and Hadley 1978, 281-3).
Reagan Republicanism
Working class frustration with Democratic social policies came to a head again in the 1980
and 1984 presidential elections. Republican candidate Ronald Reagan garnered an average of 61%
of white working-class votes across the two elections, forming a coalition of “Reagan Democrats”
(Edsall 2016a; Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008, 10). Though voters, particularly white voters in the
South, began supporting Republican candidates in 1964, 1980 represented the early stages of these
voters actually identifying themselves as Republicans. Referring to Table 7, there is evidence of a
10-point increase in the number of white Southerners identifying as Republican between 1976 and
1984. There was also a large number of independents at this time, many of whom were
conservative former Democrats persuaded by “Reaganism” to change their identification (Black
and Black 2002, 205-6). Reaganism was largely defined by three main concerns: lower tax rates,
a stronger military, and reduced government spending on domestic programs. Reagan hoped these
values would touch “the collective subconscious of every American” as well as promote a “new
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era of national renewal emphasizing traditional values—the dignity of work, love for family and
neighborhood, faith in God, [and] belief in peace” (Black and Black 2002, 211–2).
Where the Democrats’ progressive movements alienated white and working-class voters,
Reaganism represented an appealing return to traditional American values, especially among
Southern whites. Only 18% of these voters believed their financial situation had improved over
the past year leading into the election, and another 38% felt it had worsened. In terms of foreign
policy, nearly 75% of Southern voters agreed with Reagan’s stance that the United States should
be more forceful in dealing with the Soviet Union. The general notion of American values also
touched specifically on religion, and Southern white religious conservatives—mostly evangelical
Protestants and some conservative Catholics—backed Reagan as they believed secularism
undermined their way of life. Having opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights
Act, Reagan also appealed to those who were not enamored with the civil rights movement.
Though he did not belligerently attack the civil rights acts in the manner of Wallace, his stance
produced massive inroads among racial conservatives. Consequently, Reagan won 61% of the
Southern white vote in 1980 and 72% in 1984 (Black and Black 2002, 214–8). Among the white
working class nationwide, Reagan averaged 61% support, compared to 35% averaged between
Democratic candidates Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale (Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008, 10).
The Democratic Leadership Council. In the wake of Reagan’s success in the 1984
presidential election, the Democratic Party hoped to reconfigure its approach to the electorate and
organized the Democratic Leadership Council. Virginia Governor Charles Robb, chairman of
Democratic governors at the time, organized the DLC with the help of several other conservative
Democrats who shared his fear that the party’s liberals would hurt its chances in state and
congressional elections. The major problems this group saw within the Democratic Party was its

31

narrow range of interest groups, including organized labor, feminists, and minority organizations.
The DLC hoped instead to tie the party to a broader range of interests relating to the working-class
voters who had been moving toward the Republican Party. The mission of the DLC, as described
by a former policy director, was not to move the Democrats to the right, but rather to “revitalize
the Democratic Party” by any means necessary. Policy goals of the DLC included fighting
protectionism in domestic and foreign markets, increased workplace democracy, improved
education, new environmental protection initiatives, a guaranteed working wage, and increased
aid to low-income families. The theme of these initiatives was turning the Democratic Party into
one of “opportunity rather than government” (Rae 1994, 113–8).
This approach finally began gaining momentum during the 1992 presidential election when
it was embraced by Democratic candidate Bill Clinton. Clinton’s campaign emphasized the notion
that “if you work hard and play by the rules you’ll be rewarded”; thus his platform drew on the
council’s recommendations and highlighted welfare reform and tax cuts for the middle class
(Teixeira and Abramowitz 2008, 11; Edsall 2016a). Clinton utilized some DLC strategies again in
1996 and won reelection. However, across the two elections he only received an average of 41%
of votes from white working-class voters who were an important target of the DLC policies—
though it must be noted that Ross Perot ran independent and third-party campaigns during each
election and appealed to many working-class whites (Teixeria and Abramowitz 2008, 11). In the
South, on the other hand, Clinton had the most success of any Democratic candidate since Carter.
Winning Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Georgia in 1992 and losing by close margins in
Florida and North Carolina, Clinton’s success is impressive considering the Democratic standing
in the South. However, both his fairly moderate track record and Southern upbringing made his
success difficult to replicate (Rae 1994, 146–150). Indeed, Al Gore, Clinton’s would-be successor,
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could not capture the presidency in 2000 after losing the white working class by 17 points. John
Kerry performed even worse, losing the group by 23 points in 2004 (Teixeira and Abramowitz
2008, 11).
The 2008 and 2012 Presidential Elections
Barack Obama’s 2008 and 2012 campaigns and coalitions deserve special attention in the
saga of presidential elections and party coalitions. In 2008, white Southerners remained firmly on
the side of the Republican Party. White voters comprised 65% of the electorate in Alabama and
62% in Mississippi, two states in the Deep South; in the former state, Republican candidate John
McCain won the white vote 88% to 10% and in the latter state, McCain won 88% to 11%. The
mirror image is true in Southern regions with high populations of black voters: Obama was
dominant in Alabama’s Black Belt and the Mississippi Delta region, both predominantly black,
rural, poor, and sparsely populated (Cohen 2012). Again in 2012, Obama won just 17% of white
voters in the Deep South and in Texas. There has, however, been increased turnout of black
voters—who make up nearly one third of the South’s population—who have consistently
supported the Democratic Party in large margins over the Republican Party. Nevertheless, the
Democrats are still disadvantaged because black voters are either concentrated in urban areas or
in small rural towns, both of which are drawn into Democratic districts that minimize the effects
of their vote on state elections (Cohn 2014).
Yet Barack Obama’s victorious campaigns in 2008 and 2012 seemed to inspire hope that
the white working class had not entirely spurned the Democratic Party. The white working class
is an often overlooked demographic of the Obama coalition, which has generally been considered
to be comprised of young, diverse, and well-educated voters. In truth, 34% of Obama’s voters were
whites without college degrees, outnumbering the vote contributions of black voters, Hispanic
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voters, and well-educated whites (Cohn 2016). Among the white working-class voters nationwide,
the results were very close between Obama and McCain; 47% of white voters making under
$50,000 voted for Obama, while 51% voted for McCain. McCain had a larger margin among white
non-college voters, as Obama received 40% of the vote and McCain 58% (CNN 2008). In 2012,
this division increased with Obama garnering the support of 36% of non-college whites, with 61%
voting for Romney (Tyson and Maniam 2016).
Though he did not win a majority among the white working class, Obama fared better than
any recent Democratic presidential candidate. However, white working-class votes for Obama can
be interpreted as votes against McCain and Romney. Major factors in Obama’s support, especially
in 2008, were the issues that most concerned the voters. In 2008, 85% of voters reported that they
were concerned about the country’s economic conditions, and 54% of these voters backed Obama.
Furthermore, of the 81% of voters that were worried an economic crisis would hurt their family,
58% voted for Obama. These economic concerns largely reflected unease with the Bush
administration and its dealings with the financial recession; indeed, 42% of voters believed their
family’s financial situation was worse than it was in 2004, and 72% of these voters supported
Obama. As a whole, 75% of the electorate in 2008 felt that the country was on the wrong track,
nearly a 25-point increase from 2004 (CNN 2008). Thus, much of Obama’s support in 2008 can
be explained by financial unease that was not being properly attended to by President Bush.
Though confidence in Obama’s ability to significantly improve the economy dwindled by
2012, the presidential incumbent still fared better than past Democratic presidential candidates
among the white working class by attempting to be more palatable than his opponent. Obama
campaigned among the white working class by painting Romney as a business man who would
outsource jobs and not protect working-class people from globalization and large corporations. His
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campaign also drew heavily on his protection of the auto industry, which employed many workingclass whites in the Rust belt. Obama juxtaposed his auto bailout with Romney’s article titled “Let
Detroit Go Bankrupt.” Romney also campaigned for white working-class votes, though, and he
drew on “coal country” to do so. He argued that he could protect the industrial economy and
criticized Obama’s environmental policies as being a threat to the production and use of coal (Cohn
2016). Thus, just as the white working class favored the Democrats when economic issues were
salient during the New Deal era, economic concerns once again overruled possible distaste for
Obama’s social policies—and perhaps even overcame latent racial biases. Despite the brief
diversion in favor of Obama, the pattern of the white working class favoring the Republican
presidential candidate only grew, as noted, exponentially in 2016.
The 2016 Presidential Election
Many of these voters who had previously voted for Obama had increasingly negative views
of the President by 2016. As he exited office, among white voters without college degrees who
voted for both Obama and Trump, only 29% approved of Obama’s performance, while 69%
disapproved. Moreover, 75% of these voters were in favor of repealing the Affordable Care Act,
only 23% saw increases in their income over the past four years, and a meager 15% believed that
the economy had improved in the last year. What did garner these voters’ favor, however, were
Trump’s stances on immigration, police, infrastructure spending, trade, and the environment. This
falls in line with recent surveys indicating that Democrat-leaning white working-class voters hold
more conservative populist views on these issues (Cohn 2017). These issues also indicate the
importance of social and economic issues alike, and how Trump was able to motivate white
working class voters across all issues. Trump’s discussions of immigration, for example, were
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grounded not only in xenophobic rhetoric, but also in the premise that foreigners would take white
working-class jobs, an economic concern.
White voters were particularly drawn to Trump’s incendiary, racially loaded messages. As
noted, communities with overwhelmingly white populations voted strongly in favor of Trump,
more so than they did for Mitt Romney. A particularly interesting trend, however, is that many of
these communities were facing early signs of minority growth—especially growth of the
immigrant population—and were particularly anxious about increasing diversity. Though the
growth may seem small in numbers, a predominantly white community with a nonwhite population
of 2, for example, would face a growth rate of 200% if the number of nonwhite citizens increased
to just 6. Trump’s racial rhetoric, and particularly his stance on immigration, served to inflame the
fears of whites in these areas (Edsall 2017).
The Rust Belt Revolt. The clustered distribution of Democratic losses among the white
working class in the Northeast and Midwest merits a discussion focusing specifically on these
areas’ voting behaviors. Given the large-scale vote losses suffered by the Democrats in such a
closely concentrated region, scholar Michael McQuarrie (2017, 121) dubbed this phenomenon a
“Rust Belt revolt” against both the Democratic Party and Hillary Clinton. The Rust Belt states of
Wisconsin, Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, and Pennsylvania were all carried by Obama in 2012 and 2008
and lost by Clinton in 2016. Illinois is the only state in the Rust Belt she successfully defended,
and even there her share of the vote decreased by 2 points. Table 8 reflects the vote shares of all
Democratic candidates in the region dating back to 1988. These states are also crucial swing
states—Ohio has voted for the victor in every presidential election since 1964—that combine for
a total of seventy Electoral College votes. Thus, though Clinton won the nationwide popular vote,
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the rebellion against the Democratic Party occurring in the Rust Belt was determinative in placing
Trump in the White House (Edsall 2016a).
Table 8
Democratic Vote Share by Rust Belt State, Presidential Elections 1988-2016
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
Illinois
48.6*
48.6
54.3
54.6
54.8
61.9
57.6
Iowa
54.7
43.3
50.3
48.5
49.2*
53.7
52.0
Michigan
45.7*
43.8
51.7
51.3
51.2
57.4
54.2
Ohio
44.1*
40.2
47.4
46.4*
48.7*
51.5
50.7
Pennsylvania
48.4*
45.1
49.2
50.6
50.9
54.3
52.1
Wisconsin
51.4
41.1
48.8
47.8
49.7
56.2
52.9
1. An asterisk (*) indicates an election in which the Democratic candidate was not the victor.
Source: Peters and Woolley. “Presidential Election Data.” The American Presidency Project.

2016
55.8
41.7*
47.3*
43.6*
47.9*
46.5*

Democratic support in the region, though previously strong, has been dwindling over the
past few decades with the collapse of the regional economy. However, economic anxieties alone
did not produce a Republican victory in the area. Rather, with this economic collapse came, slowly
but surely, the deterioration of the institutions that served to connect local parties to voters. These
institutions include governance arrangements, civic associations, social policies, party
organizations, and labor unions (McQuarrie 2017, 122). Thus, the white working-class voters of
the Rust Belt felt forgotten and alienated by the Democratic Party. Trump ran a campaign that
showed Rust Belt voters a different Republican candidate than they were used to. This prompted
a “return of the ignored” in which the white working-class voters in the Midwest finally felt heard.
These voters’ trend toward ethno-nationalism can be understood as a result of longstanding disconnection between the voters and the party representatives (McQuarrie 2016, 130).
Whereas the Democratic candidate was evidently not listening to the Rust Belt, the Republican
candidate gave them a microphone and welcomed them into his coalition with open arms.
Moreover, Clinton represented “establishment politics that had sacrificed the region” (McQuarrie
2016, 142) On the other hand, Trump was expressly anti-establishment in every sense of the term,
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and he “gave Rust Belt voters the opportunity to express their anger and disappointment by
exacting revenge on the party that had turned its back on them” and returned to these voters “their
ability to speak in presidential politics,” an ability previously reserved only for the likes of unions
and party organizations (McQuarrie 2016, 142).
The decline of union strength. Trump’s victory in the Rust Belt is attributable not only to
the white working class but also to union households. At the national level, Trump outperformed
Romney by only 3% among unionized voters, but Clinton’s vote share among this group fell 7%
from Obama’s showing in 2012 (Clark 2017, 241-2). Unions were once a major factor in keeping
the Rust Belt in the Democratic Party’s pocket, but their power has subsided with the closing of
mines and mills. An immediate reason for dwindling union power is that union membership has
declined over the years. In the Rust Belt, unionized rates were above 30% in 1964 but that number
had dropped to around 10% by 2016 (McQuarrie 2017, 139). Moreover, the percentage of black,
Hispanic, and female union members has risen; notably, these are all groups that voted for Clinton
in 2016 (Greenhouse 2016).
The case of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania, a state that had sided with the Democrats since
the 1992 presidential election, provides insight into the shift of the white working class in the Rust
Belt. The state is representative of the course the 2016 election took in the Rust Belt, as Trump
had impressive success in increasing his margins over the Democrats in nearly every county. In
order to win the state election after election, the Democratic Party had to overcome the advantage
held by Republicans in rural counties by claiming enough votes in Philadelphia and the
surrounding suburban counties—Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery—as well as in
Pittsburgh. Clinton succeeded in capturing Philadelphia and its suburban counties, but she was
unable to secure the state. Only 76% of white working-class voters who had voted for Obama in
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Pennsylvania also voted for Clinton. Had she won the white working class of Pennsylvania by the
same margins Obama had in 2012, could have been poised to win the state. Instead, she was unable
to overcome Trump’s headway among this group, especially in rural Pennsylvania. Trump not
only won all but one of the 54 counties claimed by Romney in 2012, he won 50 of them by a larger
margin than Romney had, and 10 of them by at least 10 percentage points more than Romney had.
(Clark 2017, 240).
Three of the counties that flipped from
Democrat to Republican in 2016 are particularly
representative of the Rust Belt revolt. The
counties,

Erie,

Luzerne, and

Northampton

(highlighted in Figure 2), were all previously
Figure 2.

blue-collar communities faced with economic hardships following decades of deindustrialization
in the region. The counties also historically had strong union presences until mills, mines, and
factories began to close. Erie County had previously been home to a Great Lake port that regularly
shipped iron ore to Pittsburgh steel mills, as well as to a lucrative General Electric production
facility; both businesses dwindled in the 1990s, resulting in job loss. Luzerne County’s largest
source of income was the production of anthracite coal until the 1970s, as well as textile production
until imports from the South and abroad forced the industry out of business. The largest employer
in Northampton County had been Bethlehem Steel, but this business too was forced to close in the
1990s (Clark 2017).
Had Clinton won these counties by the same margin Obama had, or had she won over more
voters in Philadelphia, she would have won the state. Trump won Erie by 2%, up 18.1% from
Romney’s performance; Luzerne by a whopping 20.1%, a 24.9% uptick; and Northampton by
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4.6%, a 9.3% increase. Clinton, it seemed, did not speak enough to challenges faced by these
communities, whereas Trump’s campaigns touched on the shared fears of safety, security, and
jobs—as well as racist, sexist, and xenophobic sentiments—held by many white working-class
voters in Pennsylvania and the Rust Belt. In a survey conducted by the Washington Post–Kaiser
Family Foundation, 57% of white working-class voters in the Rust Belt were confident that Trump
would keep the country safe from terrorism, 61% believed that he would protect their personal
freedoms, and 51% felt that he would create jobs in the region (Clark 2017, 252).
Additionally, the survey indicated that many of these voters continue to believe that the
economic system was rigged against them in order to benefit immigrants and people of color and
that the federal government favored these constituencies over those in the Midwest. This serves to
reinforce the notion that the area felt abandoned by the Democratic Party and supported by
Trump’s campaign messages. Following a presidential election where a populist candidate was
crowned victor, much of the future of Democratic and Republican success therefore hinges on
Donald Trump’s ability to convince the white working-class voters of the Rust Belt that he is on
their side, and on the Democratic Party’s ability to implement policies to show that they have not
forgotten their economically liberal roots.
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IV. What is the Significance of Trump Voters
for the Future of the Two Parties?
With just over one year of Donald Trump’s first presidential term complete, voters and
party officials alike have had time to adjust to the new administration and reevaluate their opinions
of both the President and their parties. Many voters who supported Trump in the 2016 presidential
election still stand by their vote, and Republican politicians who resisted and supported Trump
alike have come to stand behind him as president. However, the seemingly solidifying Republican
base will face a formidable challenge when they battle the Democratic Party at the polls during the
2018 congressional election. Both parties are vying for control of the House of Representatives in
particular and will attempt to make inroads among vulnerable voters. For the Republicans this
means strengthening their ties to white working-class voters, while the Democrats will hope to
coax back these voters who once supported the party.
Evaluating Trump’s First Year in Office
One of the most immediately obvious ways to gauge satisfaction with the president is
through approval ratings. As of January 2018, with Trump having been in office for one year, an
average drawn from numerous polls estimates the President’s
approval rating to be around 40%, with over 50%
disapproving. This is the lowest approval rating of any
president at the one-year

mark dating back to Harry S.

Truman; Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan are the only two
other presidents from this time span with a first-year rating
below 50% (see Table 9). Trump’s rating of 40% also puts him
22 points below the average first-year approval rating of all
presidents from Truman through Obama. Furthermore, his net

Table 9
Presidential Approval Ratings
at One-Year Mark
Harry S. Truman
50
Dwight D. Eisenhower 71
John F. Kennedy
79
Lyndon B. Johnson
74
Richard M. Nixon
60
Gerald R. Ford
44
Jimmy Carter
55
Ronald Reagan
49
George H.W. Bush
78
Bill Clinton
57
George W. Bush
81
Barack Obama
50
Donald Trump
40
Source: Enten 2018.
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approval rating—measured by subtracting disapproval from approval ratings—is a meager -15
points, making Trump the only president whose net approval is negative after one year in office
(Enten 2018).
Further cause for concern for the President is the number of voters who are wary of his
commitment to his campaign promises. Compared to his first month in office, when 60% of all
voters believed he “keeps his promises,” only 39% felt the same by January 2018, a 21-point
decline. This drop is more pronounced among Democrats and Democratic leaners; though their
confidence in Trump’s ability to keep his promises started at a much lower 39% of voters in
February 2017, it further dropped to 14% January 2018. Among Republicans and Republican
leaners, a decline is also evident, though less dramatic: at the beginning of his term 90% of these
voters believed that Trump keeps his promises, whereas 75% still believed this to be true at the
conclusion of Trump’s first year (Pew Research Center 2018, 10).
These less-than-optimistic statistics do not necessarily spell disaster for either Trump or
the Republican Party moving forward. Many of the voters who supported Trump in the general
election still view him quite favorably. In a study done by Pew Research Center (2018), nine
groups had a more favorable opinion of Trump compared with the national average (this is true for
both the 40% approval rating found by FiveThirtyEight and the 37% approval rating found by Pew
Research Center). Table 10 displays the opinions of various demographic groups concerning
Trump’s first year in office. The groups with a more favorable opinion than the rest of the country
are male voters, white voters, voters above the age of 50, voters without a college degree, selfidentified Republicans, and white Protestants—especially white evangelicals. Indeed, based on
exit polling data (see Table 1) Trump won all these groups in the 2016 election by large margins
and has evidently earned their lasting support.
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Table 10
Trump Approval Ratings by Demographic Group
Disapprove
Average
56
Men
52
Gender
Women
59
White
46
Race
Black
76
Hispanic
78
18-29
66
Age
30-49
61
50-64
46
65+
49
High school or less
49
Education
Some college
53
College graduate
66
Postgraduate degree
75
2
Republican
15
Partisanship
Democrat
88
White evangelical Protestant
21
Religion (by race)
White mainline Protestant
44
Black Protestant
76
Catholic
60
Unaffiliated
73
1. An asterisk (*) indicates approval rating above the national average.
2. Including those who lean Republican or lean Democrat.
Source: Pew Research Center 2018, 5.

Approve1
37
42*
32
47*
14
15
27
30
47*
45*
41*
40*
31
23
80*
7
72*
48*
13
34
19

Furthermore, many Republicans also hold favorable views of Trump’s personal attributes.
When asked whether certain positive traits describe Trump, Republicans overwhelming said they
did while Democrats had far less favorable opinions. The traits that were considered most aptly to
describe the President were “able to get things done,” “a strong leader,” “trustworthy,” “cares
about people like me,” and “well-informed.” Each of these attributes were agreed upon as good
descriptors by at least 70% of Republicans and Republican leaners, with “able to get things done”
and “a strong leader” being agreed upon by over 80% of the respondents. The two remaining traits,
“a good communicator” and “even-tempered,” received less support, with 59% of Republicans
believing the former describes Trump, and 49% agreeing with the latter. Aside from “able to get

43

things done,” no trait was believed by more than 20% of Democrats or Democratic leaners to
describe Trump (Pew Research Center 2018, 11).
A third indicator of Trump’s continuing support from his voters are the opinions of
“reluctant” Trump voters. These middle-of-the-road voters are a helpful indication of Trump’s job
approval because they are not steadfast Republicans or steadfast conservatives who felt a strong
connection to either the candidate or the party. Therefore, their opinion is crucial as these voters
could easily swing to the Democratic Party should they become disillusioned with Trump. In a
survey asking Trump voters to rank how enthusiastically they voted for the candidate on a 5-point
scale from “very excited” to “not excited at all,” about 15% of these voters responded that they
were not excited at all. This group makes up the so-called reluctant Trump voters. They are 85%
white, 43% are above the age of 55, 37% had at least a college degree, and 75% identified as
Republican or Republican-leaning (Malone 2017). However, reluctant as the group may have been
in November 2016 to vote for Trump, over half of the group said they had “no regrets” about their
vote, though nearly 30% said that “the jury was still out.” Moreover, whereas only 14% of the
reluctant voters approved of Trump’s performance as of April 2017, there was an 8-point spike by
January 2018, with 22% of the voters saying they approved of Trump’s work (Malone 2018).
Initial Resistance and Eventual Acceptance of Trump among Republican Leaders
The opinions of Trump held by Republican voters offer a slightly different image from the
opinions of Republican Party leaders. While Trump’s opponents, especially those in the
Democratic Party, continue to fight against his nationalist and populist rhetoric, many
establishment Republicans who initially resisted Trump’s messages have come around to support
him. Furthermore, Trump’s rhetoric is notably continuing to “[take] root within his adopted party,”
according to Jonathan Martin and Jeremy W. Peters of The New York Times (2017), “and those
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uneasy with grievance politics are either giving in or giving up the fight.” Senior members of the
Republican establishment have decided to retire from office, including Joe Straus, the speaker of
the Texas House of Representatives and long-time friend of the Bush family, as well as Senators
Bob Corker of Tennessee and Jeff Flake of Arizona. Joining this group are Representatives Ileana
Ros-Lehitan of Florida, Charlie Dent of Pennsylvania, Pat Tiberi of Ohio, and Dave Reichert of
Washington State (Martin and Peters 2017).
The Republican candidates who remain have also begun taking up the fiery rhetoric so
common in Trump’s speeches, while the only prominent Republicans who choose to go against
the President are lame ducks and those out of office, such as George W. Bush who commented
that Trump makes him (Bush) look good by comparison (Martin and Peters 2017). The reason for
so many Republicans falling in line behind Trump is the President’s willingness to denounce or
fire those who cross him. Rather than base his hiring and firing decisions on policy positions,
however, Trump has often tapped for jobs in the White House those who have publicly praised
him, while firing those who have criticized his actions. A prime example of this pattern is the
hiring of John Bolton to replace H.R. McMaster as national security advisor. Bolton frequently
spoke favorably about Trump while acting as an analyst for Fox News, while McMaster has
expressed his distaste for Trump’s handling of foreign policy. Bolton’s hiring is also not likely due
to his agreement with Trump’s policies, given that he advocated the war in Iraq, whereas Trump
called it a “big fat mistake.” Bolton also urged preemptive strikes on North Korea, whereas Trump
has planned to meet with Kim Jong Un (Bacon Jr. 2018).
A similar pattern arises with the firing of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in favor of Mike
Pompeo; both men have policy differences with Trump, but Tillerson was reported to have called
Trump a “moron” while Pompeo called Trump’s consideration of various issues “sophisticated”
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(Bacon, Jr. 2018). The list goes on with the a substitution of Larry Kudlow for Gary Cohn on the
National Economic Council, and the rumored swaps of Mick Mulvaney for John Kelly as White
House chief of staff and Scott Pruitt for Jeff Sessions as Attorney General. It is true that many
presidents eventually replace staff members with others who may be more loyal, but in the case of
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, for example, these changes generally occurred after the
presidents had been elected to serve a second term (Bacon, Jr. 2018).
Perhaps the most illuminating example of Republicans turning the party over to Trump is
the series of exchanges between the president and Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential
nominee in 2012. Romney was critical of Trump during the 2016 campaign, and began calling on
him to release his tax returns and warning of a potential “bombshell” hidden within. Trump
responded, via Twitter, by calling Romney “one of the dumbest and worst candidates in the history
of Republican politics” (Watkins 2018). The jabs continued, with Romney labeling Trump a
“phony, a fraud” and claiming that Trump’s promises are “as worthless as a degree from Trump
University.” Romney was speaking at the University of Utah’s Hinckley Institute of Politics Forum
at the time, and went on to say that “dishonesty is Donald Trump’s hallmark.” Trump responded
by pointing out the irony in Romney’s attack, given that he had sought Trump’s endorsement while
campaigning. The exchange then moved to Twitter, with Romney claiming that he would have
neither sought nor accepted Trump’s endorsement four years prior had Trump said “the things he
says today about the KKK, Muslims, Mexicans, [and the] disabled” (Bradner and Treyz 2016).
At the time, this Republican in-fighting seemed to be evidence of an increasingly fractured
party. By February 2018, however, even Romney had come full circle to put his name in the
running for Secretary of State, and to once again seek Trump’s endorsement as he entered the Utah
senatorial race. On February 19, 2018, Trump tweeted the following: “[Mitt Romney] has

46

announced he is running for the Senate from the wonderful State of Utah. He will make a great
Senator and worthy successor to [Orrin Hatch], and has my full support and endorsement!”
Romney’s response, also via Twitter, was posted within an hour: “Thank you Mr. President for the
support. I hope that over the course of the campaign I also earn the support and endorsement of
the people of Utah” (Watkins 2018). The endorsement followed the urging of Senate majority
leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, who was looking toward the 2018
congressional elections and, speaking for the Republican Party, said “we don’t want to lose the
seat” (Rogers 2018).
Looking Forward to the 2018 Congressional Elections
The 2018 midterm elections will likely be a pivotal political event, as there is a very tight
race for control of Congress. To reclaim the House of Representatives where they have been the
minority party since 2010, Democrats will have to flip 24 Republican seats while maintaining their
current hold on 194 other seats. Of the 435 House seats to be contested, 48 are considered
competitive. Forty-one of these seats are currently held by Republicans with the other 7 being
occupied by Democrats; but in 25 of the 48 districts, Hillary Clinton outperformed Trump in the
2016 presidential election. These will likely be targets for the Democrats, while the Republicans
will likely focus on flipping 12 Democratic districts that favored Trump in the presidential election.
Despite the pressure of flipping 24 seats and retaining another 194, many analysts have been
favoring the Democratic Party’s chances in the 2018 elections. Furthermore, swinging 24 seats is
not as daunting a task as it may seem; in over half of the midterm elections since 1994, there have
been swings equal to or greater than the task before the Democrats this year (Lee 2018).
The Democrats also stand to gain some confidence from polling data suggesting, as of
January 2018, 54% of polled registered voters plan to support the Democratic candidate for
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Congress in their district, while only 39% plan to support Republican candidates (see Table 11).
The strongest supporters for Democratic congressional candidates are predictable in that they
mirror the groups that gave Clinton her largest vote shares in 2016. These groups include female
voters, black and Hispanic voters, voters under the age of 50, and voters with college and
postgraduate degrees. Groups likely to support Democratic congressional candidates but that did
not back Clinton in 2016 are male voters and voters who attended college without graduating
(though most white voters with some college still would not support a Democratic candidate).
Republican congressional candidates, on the other hand, have notably made less headway among
either the Trump or Clinton coalitions.
Table 11
Congressional Vote Preferences1
All registered voters

Democratic
53

Republican
39

Gender

Male
Female

50
55

41
37

Race

White
Black
Hispanic

43
88
67

49
9
25

Age

18-29
30-49
50-64
65+

66
58
44
47

27
33
48
47

Education

High school or less
Some college
College graduate
Postgraduate degree

45
51
58
70

48
39
34
25

Education
(whites only)

High school or less
28
65
Some college
42
48
College graduate
53
40
Postgraduate degree
65
29
1. Percent of registered voters who say they support or lean toward the Democratic or Republican
candidate for Congress in their district.
Source: Pew Research Center 2018, 20.
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The results of special elections over the first year of Trump’s presidency also provide
valuable context for predicting the outcome of the 2018 midterm elections. Across all special
elections this year, turnout has been remarkably high. In the special election occurring in
Pennsylvania’s 18th district—to be evaluated more fully below—228,000 ballots had been cast,
which amounts to 62% of the votes counted in the district in November 2016. This number
corresponds closely to the turnout rate of midterm elections, where the number of ballots cast is
about 60 to 70% as high as in presidential elections. Similarly, in the special Alabama Senate
election, the turnout was 64% of that during the 2016 election. Furthermore, within Pennsylvania’s
18th district, Democratic-leaning Allegheny County (bordering Pittsburgh) had a turnout rate
equaling 67% of the 2016 turnout, while this number was only 60% in Republican-leaning
Westmoreland County. This “enthusiasm gap” indicates more success than do traditional
registered-voter polls, as any voter is eligible to respond to a survey, but it is those who arrive at
the polls that actually cast their votes (Silver 2018).
PA-18. On March 13, 2018, Conor Lamb, a Democrat, won a very narrow contest for a
congressional seat representing Pennsylvania’s 18th district. He claimed victory with 113,813 votes
over Republican competitor Rick Saccone’s 113,186 votes. Of the four counties in the district,
Allegheny, Westmoreland, Washington, and Greene, Lamb won only Allegheny, the most
populous. However, every municipality in the district save two voted more Democratic than it had
in the 2016 presidential election. Trump had won the district, which is composed of rural and
suburban areas just outside of Pittsburgh, by nearly 20 points (Cohn et al. 2018). The demographics
of the district align closely with the demographics of the Trump coalition; 94% of residents are
white while only 2% are black, the median household income is $55,553, and the high school
graduation rate is 94% whereas the college graduation rate is only 33% (Ballotpedia).

49

Congressional excitement in Pennsylvania is not limited to the state’s 18th district. Indeed,
the state was an important battleground in 2016 and swung the election in Trump’s favor; and if
the 2018 special election was any indication, the congressional elections will likely provide much
excitement. Of the 18 House seats in Pennsylvania, the Democrats are considered to be in a
position to flip at least three or as many as six seats (thanks in part to a redistricting plan ordered
by the state supreme court that greatly favors Democrats), which would make a considerable dent
in the 24 seats required to flip the House. College-educated voters in the suburbs are increasingly
angered by Trump; 54% of voters with college degrees reported that they identify as Democrats
or lean Democrats, the highest percentage among this group since 1994. Additionally, Lamb’s win
in PA-18 indicated that the Republican Party has somewhat fallen out of favor with white workingclass voters (Gabriel 2018).
2018 Republican strategy. The special election in Pennsylvania therefore demonstrates
what may not work for Republicans seeking House seats: riding Trump’s populist coattails.
Representative Mike Doyle of Pennsylvania notes that many voters are having “buyer’s remorse”
and feel that Trump is not keeping his promises (as previously discussed). Furthermore, Saccone
campaigned on a platform nearly identical to Trump’s, often emphasizing tax cuts enacted by the
Republican Party, and he worked closely with the President’s administration. House Speaker Paul
Ryan, alongside Representative Steve Stivers of Ohio who heads the Republican Party’s campaign
committee, thus called the election a “wake-up call” for the party. However, many party members
disagree over what Saccone—and therefore future congressional candidates—could have done
better on the campaign trail. Some were alarmed by how motivated Democrats and independent
voters were to cast anti-Trump votes, while others discredited the idea of disassociating from
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Trump, arguing that a strong core of conservative voters who still favored the President would be
needed to win congressional elections (Burns and Martin 2018).
Truthfully, Trump seems to have fairly short coattails. In the 2016 election, Trump’s share
of the vote was larger than just 24 of the elected House Republicans. This is the smallest coattail
pull a president has had since 1992 when Bill Clinton won 43% of the popular vote in a three-way
race with George H.W. Bush and Ross Perot and ran ahead of just 5 House Democrats. In the
Senate, Trump received a vote share larger than only 5 of the 22 Republican Senators elected in
2016. His vote share was consistently lower in swing states, where, for example, Trump trailed Pat
Toomey of Pennsylvania, Richard Burr of North Carolina, Marco Rubio of Florida, Ron Johnson
of Wisconsin, John McCain of Arizona, and Rob Portman of Ohio. He also consistently ran behind
in traditional Republican strongholds, leading none of the 10 Republican House candidates in
Georgia and none of the 25 in Texas. Notably, the Republican House leaders ran very far ahead of
Trump. Speaker Ryan of Wisconsin was reelected with 65% of the vote, a 12-point margin over
Trump within his district; House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy of California won with 69%
of the vote, running 11 points ahead of Trump; and House Majority Whip Steve Scalise of
Louisiana took 75% of the vote, giving him a 6-point margin over Trump (Cook 2018).
Though long coattails are certainly beneficial to a president’s party, short coattails do not
necessarily condemn the party to failure in lower-level elections. The president often tries to shape
campaign themes as Trump is doing now, while also raising money for and endorsing various
congressional candidates (Cook 2018). Given the high approval rating of Trump among
Republicans, Republican contenders for congressional seats in highly Republican districts
therefore may not need to fear invoking the President and his policies. At the same time, as
Saccone’s campaign in Pennsylvania and Trump’s nonexistent coattails in swing states may
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indicate, Republicans seeking to flip Democratic seats or hold onto their own seats in blue districts
should be wary of channeling Trump’s narrative. Democrats and Democratic leaners have been
increasingly skeptical of the President, and those voters who abandoned Clinton in 2016 may have
such strong buyer’s remorse that they return to the Democratic Party in 2018.
2018 Democratic strategy. Conversely, Lamb’s victory in Pennsylvania provides a
valuable road map for Democrats looking to make inroads into Trump country, especially in the
key Rust Belt states with white working-class voters. Lamb touted traditional Democratic ideals
such as union rights and economic fairness, but he downplayed divisive issues such as gun control.
He also attempted to separate himself from the national party and further distanced himself from
divisive political leaders on both sides of the aisle, specifically House minority leader, Democrat
Nancy Pelosi, and Speaker Ryan. Importantly, though, Lamb refrained from aggressively
criticizing Trump and instead welcomed support from people who had voted for him in 2016.
While Democrats will likely have an easier time campaigning for Republican-held seats in suburbs
where Trump is disliked, Lamb’s approach could be useful in winning seats in must-win red
districts. Other Democrats have embraced this strategy, and Representative Cheri Bustos of Illinois
has said that Democrats running for House seats should be free to oppose Pelosi, as is the case
with Paul Davis, a House candidate in Kansas (Burns and Martin 2018).
Democrats will also likely focus their attention on Obama voters who turned to support
Trump in 2016. After all, many of these voters were located in the Rust Belt and, if the election in
PA-18 is any indication, they can be lured back to the Democratic side with careful campaigning.
The best approach to winning over these swing voters has been long debated by politicians. Bernie
Sanders, in 2016, thought the best way to fight for the working class was by dismantling a rigged
system, while Trump ran a populist platform, claiming that he respected and understood working-
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class values in a way that liberal candidates did not. A possible third option, however, could be
modeled on Robert F. Kennedy’s brief 1968 presidential campaign in which he championed civil
rights by offering up “a liberalism without elitism and a populism without racism.” Kennedy’s
coalition was comprised of working-class voters, both black and white, at a time when racial
divisions ravaged the nation’s political climate (Kahlenberg 2018).
Kahlenberg (2018) therefore asks how progressives today can try to rebuild Kennedy’s
powerful coalition. Though the political climate and the salient issues today differ from those of
1968—and no prominent candidate today is the brother of a revered former president—there were
fundamental themes in Kennedy’s campaign that transcend the specificity of time-sensitive
policies. First and foremost, in appealing to white working-class voters, Democrats today need not
turn their backs on the principles of civil rights—to ignore the needs of women, people of color,
and LGBT voters is generally seen as a moral wrong among other progressives and would
inherently undermine the purpose of an inclusive form of populism. Instead, an inclusive form of
populism would incorporate issues of class inequality into civil rights messaging and relentlessly
pursue “economic justice” rather than sporadically emphasize it. Finally, to appeal to any
nationalist inclinations among Obama/Trump voters, a Bobby Kennedy-style campaign would
espouse traditional American values as a way of directly combating white nationalism. Inclusive
populism would then become more patriotic than nationalistic but it would still take a stronger
stand on domestic security than Sanders’ brand of populism (Kahlenberg 2018). Naturally, this is
not a one-size-fits-all campaign style, but it does provide a method to balance the interests of white
working-class voters who are impressed with neither major party.
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V. Conclusion
Donald Trump’s immense electoral success among once-Democratic voters indicates the
final moments of a realigning period that began in the 1960s. White—and especially white
working-class—voters who were once impressed by the Democratic Party’s commitment to their
economic interests during the New Deal Era became increasingly disenchanted with the party as
social issues forced platform overhauls of the two major parties. The earliest signs of this change
appeared during the 1960s when racial tensions and the civil rights movement were focal points
of politicians and civil rights planks were introduced into party platforms. White Southern voters
in particular became increasingly disenchanted with the Democratic Party during this time since
the social structure in the region depended largely on social systems that were implicitly racist.
The campaigns of Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, and Richard Nixon drew on these racial
resentments and offered the first signs that a “Southern strategy” could pull one-time Democrats
into the Republican Party.
This type of campaign continued throughout the remainder of the 20th century, with Ronald
Reagan espousing traditional American values to win over white working-class voters. Indeed,
during the 1980s these voters truly began seeing themselves as Republicans. Bill Clinton’s election
and Barack Obama’s coalition offered some hope for the Democrats that not all was lost among
the white working class, but Hillary Clinton could not repeat their success in 2016. Instead,
Trump’s insurrectionist, populist campaign offered a chance to shake up the political
establishment, an offer that voters who felt ignored and unheard by Democratic presidential
candidates could not refuse. White working-class voters across the country turned out in droves
for the Republican candidate, signaling what could finally be the end of the Democrats’
relationship with these voters at the presidential level. The recent special elections indicate that
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this change in allegiance is less dramatic in state-level elections, but the 2018 midterm elections
will provide a clearer picture on where the white working class stands. As of now, however, one
thing is certain: Donald Trump was extraordinarily successful in appealing to the Republican
coalition of one-time Democrats that has been steadily building over the past five decades. If his
approval rating among these voters remains high during the remainder of his tenure, the fate of
these voters may be sealed, leaving the Democrats to find a new path to the presidency, which, for
the party that put forward the New Deal, would be “deplorable” in and of itself.
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